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THE INTRINSICALLY CORRUPTING 
INFLUENCE OF PRECEDENT 
Michael Stokes Paulsen* 
Whatever one's theory of constitutional interpretation, a 
theory of stare decisis, poured on top and mixed in with it, always 
corrupts the original theory. If one is an originalist-that is, if one 
believes that the Constitution should be understood and applied 
in accordance with the objective meaning the words and phrases 
would have had to an informed general public at the time of 
their adoption1-then stare decisis, understood as a theory of ad-
hering to prior judicial precedents that are contrary to the origi-
nal public meaning, is completely irreconcilable with originalism. 
Stare decisis contradicts the premise of originalism-that it is the 
original meaning of the words of the text, and not anything else, 
that controls constitutional interpretation. To whatever extent 
precedents inconsistent with original meaning are accepted as 
controlling (whether sometimes and to some extent, or always 
and absolutely), such acceptance undermines-even refutes-
the premises that are supposed to justify originalism? 
* McKnight Presidential Professor of Law & Public Policy and Briggs & Morgan 
Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Copyright 2005. All rights reserved. 
I. See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of 
the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1124-33 (2003) (explaining 
and defending original-public-meaning textualism as the single correct approach to con-
stitutional interpretation); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia 
Unconstitutional?, 90 CAL. L. REv. 291, 398 (2002) (explaining and employing this meth-
odology to ascertain the original public meaning of a semicolon in Article IV of the Con-
stitution). 
2. Some notable would-be originalists accept stare decisis as a limitation on, or 
qualification of, their originalist interpretive premises, without recognizing that such ac-
ceptance fundamentally undermines their entire interpretive justification. See, e.g., 
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLffiCAL SEDUCfiON OF THE 
LAW 155-59 (1990); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
CoURTS AND THE LAW 138--40 (1997) ("The whole function of the doctrine is to make us 
say that what is false under proper analysis must nonetheless be held to be true, all in the 
interest of stability. It is a compromise of all philosophies of interpretation .... [ S]tare 
decisis is not pan of my originalist philosophy; it is a pragmatic exception to it."). Others, 
the few and the proud, are more pure. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case 
Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 23 (1994). Non-originalists of various 
stripes recognize the conflict between originalism and stare decisis, as well illustrated by 
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If one is a non-originalist, pragmatist, or otherwise out-
come-driven "interpreter" of the Constitution-that is, if one be-
lieves that the Constitution should be interpreted in such a man-
ner as to produce justice, good outcomes, or workable and fair 
solutions to social and political problems, and not be inhibited 
by the constraints of constitutional text, structure, and history-
stare decisis corrupts and undermines such an interpretive the-
ory, too. After all, why should an interpreter be bound by prece-
dents that stand in the way of one's conception of justice if one is 
not bound by the language and original meaning of the Constitu-
tion itself? It would be silly to let errant (on these criteria), un-
just precedents block the way, especially if the Constitution itself 
is not allowed to do so. 
One can, I submit, play this parlor game with any and every 
theory of constitutional interpretation. If one has a theory of 
stare decisis that permits precedent decisions to have genuine 
decision-altering weighe -that is, if precedents dictate different 
results than the interpreter otherwise would reach in the absence 
of such precedents- then stare decisis corrupts the otherwise 
"pure" constitutional decision-making process. This rule (may I 
call it "Paulsen's Rule"?) cuts across all different interpretive 
methodologies. Posit an approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion that yields what, on that theory, is the correct interpretation 
of the Constitution.4 Then, add a theory of stare decisis that ac-
cords decision-altering force to precedents that would otherwise 
the contributions of Professor Merrill and Professor Strauss in this issue. Thomas W. 
Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. 
COMMENT. 271, 274 (2005) (preferring to tilt toward precedent and away from original-
ism for "conservative" policy reasons of promoting a style of judging that produces "few-
est surprises"); David Strauss, Originalism, Precedent, and Candor, 22 CONST. 
COMMENT. 299 (2005) (preferring precedent to originalism for "liberal" policy reasons 
(but probably preferring liberal policy to precedent, too)). 
3. I concede the possibility-and believe it often to be the reality-that invocation 
of precedent is merely a ruse, intentionally or unintentionally, and never exerts genuine 
restraining effect on an interpreter in a subsequent case. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest 
Proposals from the Twenty-third Century, 59 ALB. L. REV. 671, 679-S1 (1995) (noting 
that invocation of stare decisis is often "a hoax designed to provide cover for a particular 
outcome, not a genuine, principled ground of decision."). My argument in the text as-
sumes (at least for the sake of argument) the situation where precedent is honestly in-
voked and has real decision-altering weight. In such a case, I argue that stare decisis cor-
rupts whatever other interpretive theory it modifies. In any other case, "stare decisis is 
simply irrelevant, or deceptive: a court that invokes the doctrine to justify a decision it 
was prepared to reach on other grounds is adding a makeweight, or using the doctrine as 
a cover for its judgment on the merits." Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth 
of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2706,2732 (2003) [hereinafter Marbury]. 
4. I address presently the "but-there-arc-no-right-answers-to-constitutional-questions" 
canard/objection. See infra text accompanying note 18. 
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be thought wrong under that approach to constitutional interpre-
tation. The result is a deviation from the (by hypothesis) correct 
interpretation of the Constitution. 
This should be a source of considerable concern to the de-
fender of the interpretive theory in question (whatever it is). 
Stare decisis not only impairs or corrupts proper constitutional 
interpretation. Stare decisis is unconstitutional, precisely to the 
extent that it yields deviations from the correct interpretation of 
the Constitution! It would have judges apply, in preference to 
the Constitution, that which is not consistent with the Constitu-
tion. That violates the premise on which judicial review rests, as 
set forth in Marbury. If one accepts the argument for judicial re-
view in Marbury as being grounded, correctly, in the supremacy 
of the Constitution (correctly interpreted) over anything incon-
sistent with it, and as binding the judiciary to enforce and apply 
the Constitution (correctly interpreted) in preference to any-
thing inconsistent with it, then courts must apply the correct in-
terpretation of the Constitution, never a precedent inconsistent 
with the correct interpretation. It follows, then, that if Marbury 
is right (and it is), stare decisis is unconstitutional.5 
There is one possible exception to this conclusion, and a few 
possible variations on it. You've probably been thinking of one 
or another of them already, loading up to refute Paulsen's Rule. 
The exception is a theory of constitutional interpretation that 
purports to regard judicial precedents as themselves constitutive 
of constitutional meaning. That is, past judicial decisions actually 
do define the meaning of the Constitution. Under such a theory, 
our written Constitution operates much like an unwritten consti-
tution would. (Such an interpretive theory for a written constitu-
tion is deeply problematic on other grounds, but I pass over 
those deeper problems for present purposes.6) The Constitu-
tion's meaning is determined by judicial precedents interpreting 
it, in kind of a "common law"-ish sense. The most prominent 
(and best) academic theorist of such a "common law" method of 
constitutional interpretation is Professor David Strauss.7 (This is 
5. This is a generalization of an argument earlier sketched by Professor Gary Law-
son. Lawson, supra note 2. For a thorough defense, see Paulsen, Marbury, supra note 3, 
at 2731-34. Marbury is right (on this point) not because it is a revered precedent, but be· 
cause it is right on uncorrupted originalist interpretive principles. See id. at 2733 n.78. 
6. For a discussion, see Kesavan & Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitu· 
tion's Secret Drafting History, supra note 1, at 1127-33; see also Paulsen, Marbury, supra 
note 3, at 2739-42. 
7. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 877 (1996). 
292 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:289 
not quite an accurate description of the common law method, ei-
ther, which does not, at least not in its pure form, treat judicial 
decisions as creating the law, but as evidence of the accepted un-
derstanding of the law.8 But this too is largely beside the main 
point here, and so I pass this point quickly too. My main point 
here is to show that such a theory is self-defeating-an illustra-
tion of Paulsen's Rule rather than a true exception to it.) 
The chief variation on this supposed exception to Paulsen's 
Rule is where one posits an interpretive theory under which 
precedent is part of, or allied with, one or another (or many) ap-
proaches to constitutional interpretation. Precedent is still con-
stitutive of constitutional meaning. But so are other things. And 
everything qualifies everything else. The most prominent (and 
best) academic theorist of such a "Common Law Plus" method 
of constitutional interpretation is Professor Richard Fallon.9 
Let me start with the more unalloyed version of the argu-
ment (closer to David Strauss's). At the root of any argument 
that judicial precedent is constitutive of constitutional meaning is 
the notion that the power of the judiciary "to say what the law 
is"10 implies that the law is (in Charles Evans Hughes's oft-
quoted words) "what the judges say it is." That is, that judges, by 
dint of their office, have the power to invest the Constitution 
with meaning, through their decisions and written opinions ex-
plaining those decisions. That is a slippery inference to be sure.11 
But let's accept it for a moment for the sake of argument: 
Judges' decisions infuse the Constitution with determinative 
meaning (at least to some unspecified extent). 
Here's my problem: Why last year's judges and not this 
year's? If the premise that supports a theory of stare decisis is 
that the judges have the power to bring meaning to the Constitu-
tion, then why don't today's judges have the same power to bring 
or give meaning to the Constitution? Surely the answer cannot 
be (or cannot be and remain principled) that the judicial power 
to vest the Constitution with meaning is a progressively dimin-
ishing power over the years. That would mean that the "judicial 
8. For fuller discussion, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by 
Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Weight of Roe and Casey? 109 YALE L.J. 
1535, 1570-82 (2000); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the 
Founding Era to the Rehnquist Coun, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647,665--66 (1999). 
9. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional In-
terpretation, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1189 (1987). 
10. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
II. Paulsen, Marbury, supra note 3, at 2711-25, 2739-42 (explaining this slippery 
error). 
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power" meant one thing at time X and something less at time X 
+ 1. More than that, it is hard to discern a principled a priori rea-
son why dead judges' power to invest the Constitution with 
meaning should be greater than live ones'. 12 And if the answer is 
that today's judges do have the same power to bring meaning to 
the Constitution but should "consider" or give some degree of 
"deference" to prior decisions, we are essentially back where we 
started. "Consider" precedent decisions with respect to what? 
Any answer to the "what" brings back in some other theory of 
constitutional interpretation that the theory of stare decisis is to 
some unclear degree corrupting. And how much "deference"? 
May today's judges judge the correctness of yesterday's judges 
decisions, and if so on what criteria? If they can do it at all, we're 
back to square one. A genuine theory of stare decisis requires 
giving decision-altering weight to a prior judicial decision just 
because it was a prior judicial decision, and not because of its 
merit as judged by any independent criteria extrinsic to the deci-
sion itself. 13 
The conclusion seems hard to escape: A theory of constitu-
tional interpretation under which judges' decisions are them-
selves constitutive of constitutional meaning saws off the very 
limb on which it is sitting. If judges have power to invest the 
Constitution with meaning, a theory of stare decisis that accords 
dispositive or meaningful decision-altering force to a prior deci-
sion at variance with the meaning with which a judge today 
would invest the Constitution (according to some other criteria) 
corrupts the interpretive theory of judicial power to give the 
Constitution meaning by virtue of judges' decisions. If there is an 
escape from this dilemma that does not involve circularity or 
sleight-of-hand, I have yet to see it. David?14 
12. If the retort to this query consists to any substantial degree of an argument that 
such an arrangement of diminishing judicial power of precedent is indicated by the origi-
nal meaning of the term "the judicial power" or by the original intent or original under-
standing of the framers, the retorter is in danger of giving away the game. For this would 
mean that there is another turtle underneath the theory of common Jaw interpretation-
a yet-more-fundamental interpretive theory that accords primacy to something that looks 
an awful lot like a species of Originalism. 
13. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571,571 (1987); Paulsen, Abro-
gating Stare Decisis by Statute, supra note 8, at 1538 & n.8. 
14. It is no answer to say that stare decisis is not absolute, and so last year's judges 
don't absolutely bind this year's (and, moreover, that this year's judges still have the 
power to non-absolutely bind next year's). That simply means that a non-absolute doc-
trine of stare decisis corrupts its own interpretive justification non-absolutely: it under-
mines its own justification only to the extent it has true decision-altering effect. 
Of course, the true "common law" method does not really treat prior decisions as 
literally binding, but as strongly persuasive and informative-a guide to future reasoning. 
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Professor Richard Fallon's theory is similar-"Strauss Lite," 
if you will, with respect to the interpretive force of precedent. 
Professor Fallon's theory of constitutional interpretation is sub-
tle and nifty: a number of constitutional interpretive modalities 
may legitimately be employed in the interpretive enterprise. Ar-
guments in one category might revise conclusions tentatively 
reached in other categories on uncertain evidence.15 
Up to a point, even most originalists accept a good deal of 
Fallon's approach. When I teach Constitutional Law to first year 
students, I explain the various interpretive methodologies of 
Text, Structure, History/Intent (or Purpose), Precedent, and Pol-
icy (or Pragmatism) and point out that one of the fundamental 
issues of constitutional law is which of these types of argument 
are legitimate and, if several of them are, whether there is a hi-
erarchy among them and a set of implicit rules for when an in-
terpreter should go "down" the hierarchy to a second- or third-
best source in order to resolve ambiguity that remains after con-
sidering the most legitimate source(s). 16 
But the problem for Fallon, and for any theorist of using 
multiple sources of interpretive meaning including stare decisis, 
is to justify the inclusion of precedent in the mix. What makes it a 
proper interpretive method? The answer to this question, I sub-
mit, will invariably replicate the problem that I identified with 
Professor Strauss's variation on the "common law" force of 
precedent in interpreting a written Constitution. For the answer 
necessarily will entail some version of the argument that judges 
have the power to invest the Constitution with meaning simply 
by virtue of their decisions and opinions and necessarily will run 
into the problem of justifying why last year's judges' decisions 
But that is not a theory of stare decisis in the stronger sense of deciding a case differently 
at time X+ 1 solely by virtue of the fact that a decision was made, whether rightly or 
wrongly, at time X. Thus, it may well be that so-called common law methods of constitu-
tional interpretation really mean that judges may decide cases independently of what 
precedent decisions had held; they just should look at the prior decisions and consider 
them seriously. See Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute, supra note 8, at 1544-45 
(distinguishing between the "information" function of precedents and the "disposition" 
function of precedents). But as noted in the text, if that is the case, we are back to the 
question of what interpretive criteria the judge is to apply in the first place, with stare 
decisis not truly having any decision-altering weight. 
15. See PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 3-8 (1982); Fallon, supra note 9. 
Philip Bobbitt's excellent book describes several interpretive "modalities," and obviously 
influenced Fallon's approach. 
16. For a fuller defense of my own interpretive methodology, see Vasan Kesavan & 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting His-
tory, supra note 1; Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconsti-
tutional? supra note 1, at 398-99. 
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should have a greater meaning-investing power than this year's 
judges' decisions. 
Fallon's interpretive method, and his inclusion of precedent, 
is beguiling, in substantial part because it captures reasonably 
well the realities of actual constitutional interpretive practice by 
the courts. But what Fallon so charitably (if jargonistically) de-
nominates "constructivist coherence" is, in the reality of judicial 
practice, "anything goes" -something closer to (if Professor 
Fallon will forgive me) "deconstructionist incoherence." For any 
constitutional theory that acknowledges the legitimacy of con-
sideration of multiple and potentially inconsistent sources of 
constitutional meaning there is an urgent corollary need for co-
herent and principled rules about what takes priority and when 
one can repair to less-favored modalities to resolve unclarity. 
Otherwise, if everything counts and there are no rules for what 
counts more, the wonderfully attractive portrayal of judges care-
fully using arguments in one category to revise tentative under-
standings arrived at by virtue of arguments in another category 
collapses into the image of an interpretive circular firing squad. 
And there is still the problem, for Fallon's theory as with any 
other, of the need to justify the inclusion of stare decisis as an in-
terpretive method at all. Does it have a legitimate claim to par-
ticipate in the circular firing squad, or is it simply a corruption of 
the "pure" interpretive theory (and set of decision rules) that it 
purports to qualify?17 
While we're on the subject of deconstructionist incoher-
ence, let me address one more variation on the variation of the 
false exception to Paulsen's Rule-the "but-there-are-no-right-
answers-to-constitutional-questions" canard. It is commonly 
claimed by many otherwise-intelligent people that constitutional 
questions (or at least a good many of them) have no right an-
swers (or at least no "clearly" right answers), so that, as to such 
questions, any answer is essentially as good as any other, and 
that stare decisis might be appropriate as to such issues, where 
there has been a prior judicial determination. 
With all due respect, this is an intellectually slovenly propo-
sition, for a number of reasons-most of which are beside the 
point here. It is sufficient here to note that such a view, even if 
accepted, provides no justification for a doctrine stare decisis. It 
17. For Professor Fallon's arguments that stare decisis is constitutive of constitu-
tional meaning, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay 
on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570 (2001). 
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merely says that, within the range of asserted indeterminacy, 
"anything goes" -which is itself an interpretive theory, after a 
fashion. But if "anything goes" is your theory (for any range of 
issues), "something went before" surely corrupts and contradicts 
that theory. If textual indeterminacy implies judicial carte 
blanche (within any range), a doctrine of stare decisis says that 
earlier judges get a bigger carte than their successors, a view in-
consistent with the premise that indeterminacy implies judicial 
carte blanche (within that range). Thus, the "stare-decisis-may-
be-appropriate-with-respect-to-cases-of-textual-indeterminacy" 
view is not an exception to Paulsen's Rule, but another illustra-
tion of it.18 
Another sophisticated variation of the "no right answers" 
view is that judges either are not skilled enough to identify 
"right" answers with any degree of reliability, or that judges in 
fact frequently disagree as to what the right answers are. Stare 
decisis, on this view, helps to mitigate deficiencies in competence 
and to moderate extremes. It is better to reduce variations in de-
cisions than to seek right answers, which, if they exist at all, are 
too hard to find. This, or something very close to it, is Professor 
Merrill's position.19 
Merrill's view is a variation of other policy-driven ap-
proaches to constitutional law. His favored policies-stability 
and predictability-are simply more "conservative" (in an in-
crementalist sense) and nonsubstantive than those animating 
18. The correct answer to the "indeterminacy" gambit, at least for a good original-
ist-textualist, is that indeterminacy implies broader political, democratic discretion, not 
broader judicial discretion. Judicial invalidation of legislative or executive action requires 
the existence of a sufficiently determinate constitutional rule of Jaw, so that it can fairly 
be said that the legislative or executive action violates a rule supplied by the Constitu-
tion. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say 
What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J.217, 333-37 (1994). That is Marbury's (correct) justification 
for judicial review. See generally Paulsen, Marbury, supra note 3. Thus, a decision invali-
dating political action where the constitutional text is vague or ambiguous (in the sense 
of failing to yield a determinate rule of law) is simply an incorrect constitutional decision. 
Adherence to such a precedent is adherence to a decision that is incorrect on originalist 
grounds, and thus corrupts the interpretive theory of originalism. I thus disagree with 
Randy Barnett as to the consequences of asserted indeterminacy, under an originalist-
textualist interpretive approach, and thus also disagree as to whether it creates a genuine 
exception to the principle he correctly identifies: that original meaning should always 
trump precedent where they conflict. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent With Origi-
nal Meaning: Not as Radical as it Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (2005). 
19. See Merrill, supra note 2. Steve Calabresi offers a thorough, devastating refuta-
tion of Merrill's position in his contribution to this issue. Steven G. Calabresi, Text, 
Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Originalist and Normative Arguments for Overrul-
ing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 
311 (2005). 
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other policy-driven approaches. But aside from its merits or de-
merits as a theory of constitutional interpretation, Merrill's view 
of precedent as a stabilizing force has its own problems. One 
problem is the overconfident assumption that precedents need 
less interpreting, or require less legal competence faithfully to 
interpret (aren't we still reading words, just more of them, and 
ones that sometimes contradict each other?), or are less subject 
to manipulation or evasion, or provide greater clarity, than di-
rect interpretation of the Constitution through some interpretive 
methodology or another. A second problem with this view is that 
it is usually alloyed with some (or many) other methodology ( or 
methodologies) of constitutional interpretation, combining the 
problems and imprecisions of both, with an unclear but certainly 
nonabsolute degree of "tilt"20 in the direction of precedent and 
away from the other interpretive approach(es). That is still a 
corruption of the other method(s) of constitutional interpreta-
tion, just corruption to some uncertain lesser degree. 
A third problem with this view is that it does not really pro-
vide a justification for stare decisis, in the definitional sense of 
adhering to a precedent decision even where one would other-
wise think it wrong (on other criteria). It only provides a justifi-
cation for reading and considering precedent decisions, in order 
to assist the present interpreter in figuring out the right answer, 
not for binding the present interpreter to a result that he or she 
otherwise is fully persuaded is incorrect, on other interpretive 
grounds. And if precedent is not binding, we are not really talk-
ing about a doctrine of stare decisis. (And we are also undermin-
ing the claim that precedent produces stability.)21 
The final problem with the Merrill view, and others like it, is 
the one common to all precedent-based theories of constitu-
tional adjudication. The turtle underneath it is, at some level, the 
premise that judges' interpretations create, fix, or "liquidate" 
constitutional meaning, after the fashion of the common law, at 
least to some (unclear) degree. On that premise, however, 
Paulsen's Rule still holds: if judges' decisions have the power to 
establish constitutional meaning, a doctrine of stare decisis cor-
rupts that theory by vesting earlier judges with the power to 
usurp, to some degree (usually unspecified), later judges' power 
to establish constitutional meaning. 
20. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 272, 282. 
21. See Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute, supra note 8, at 1544-48 (ad-
dressing a version of the precedent-mitigates-competency-limits argument presented by 
the Joint Opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). 
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*** 
The correct answer to all of this, of course, is that stare de-
cisis in constitutional law-the practice of giving some degree of 
decision-altering force to prior judicial interpretations simply 
because they are prior judicial interpretations and in contradic-
tion of what one otherwise would conclude are correct principles 
of constitutional interpretation and correct interpretive results 
produced by such principles- is utterly unjustifiable. Stare de-
cisis corrupts whatever interpretive method it touches. It cor-
rupts fundamentally correct interpretive principles-original 
public meaning textualism. It corrupts fundamentally incorrect 
interpretive principles-policy-driven interpretive theories of 
every kind. And it corrupts every interpretive theory that tries to 
craft an "in-between" approach, including, rather ironically, 
every theory that accords some measure of interpretive force to 
precedents solely by virtue of being precedents. 
In short, whatever theory one concludes is the correct ap-
proach to interpreting and applying the Constitution, a theory of 
stare decisis will inevitably contradict its core justifying prem-
ise(s). A doctrine of stare decisis always works in opposition to 
correct interpretation of the Constitution. 
Is there anything at all that can be said in defense of such a 
doctrine? 
